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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018  
TAGS: [MNUC](#) [KNNP](#) [IR](#) [UNSC](#) [GM](#)  
SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE TO IMPLEMENTING THE TRAVEL BAN AND  
TRAVEL VIGILANCE REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN UNSCRS 1737,  
1747, AND 1803

REF: A. STATE 34974  
[1](#)B. BERLIN 00405

Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Craig M. Conway for  
reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 7.

[1](#)2. (C) SUMMARY: PolOff (Iran Watcher) and Global Affairs Officer delivered reftel points to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Iran Desk and the MFA Export Control Division respectively. The Export Control Division emphasized its robust scrutiny of Iranian visa applications, particularly those that have been flagged as potential proliferation concerns, and the inclusion of all names mentioned in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 on a special German Government watchlist. The MFA Iran desk mentioned difficulties obtaining visa identifiers for newly listed Iranians in UNSCRs 1735, 1745, and 1803, often requiring assistance from other German government agencies. The Iran Desk also repeated its request for information about U.S. efforts to implement UNSCR 1803. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)3. (C) On April 4, Global Affairs officer delivered reftel points to German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Nancy Reck. Reck said the MFA Export Control Division only screens visa applications that have been flagged by German embassies as having potential proliferation concern. In cases involving Iranian visa cases of proliferation concern, Reck noted, applications are "heavily scrutinized" and have been "for years" predating the UNSCRs (1737, 1747 and 1803). Reck outlined the Export Control Division's role in these visa cases as follows in paragraph 4.

[1](#)4. (C) All Iranian applications received at the German Embassy in Tehran are screened for security reasons by all Schengen member countries via a limited access information-sharing computer network. In Germany, the Interior Ministry and security services also participate in this screening. Should the applicant's name or description match a list of persons of proliferation concern, the visa application is flagged for the MFA's Export Control Division. The MFA Export Control Division then reviews the visa application and, as needed, redirects the application to German security agencies for further investigation. These agencies then report their opinions on the case back to the Export Control Division. Finally, The Export Control Division collects all these opinions and formulates a yes / no response to send back to the German Embassy in Tehran.

[1](#)5. (C) Reck described the watch list of persons of proliferation concern as a subset of a larger database -- the German Government's Early Warning List -- used to flag foreign visa applications for the attention of the Export Control Division. Reck stated that the names of all Iranian persons of proliferation concern who have been included in a

UNSCR listing have already been added ("automatically") to the watchlist.

¶6. (C) On April 3, MFA Iran Desk Officers Deike Potzel and Florian Laudi described the process in similar terms, but told PolOff that the MFA has had difficulty obtaining complete sets of identifiers for listed individuals. In many cases, the MFA requests identifier input from intelligence agencies when evaluating new proposals for individuals to be listed. Potzel repeated an earlier request (reported ref B) for more information on U.S. implementation of UNSCR 1803.

¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests additional information to respond to the query in para 6.  
TIMKEN JR